"We all know what bigotry is," a friend said to me recently. But
do we?
I mean, most of us have experienced it, and we can point to
clear historical examples. But can we define it, articulating what
those examples all have in common? Or is it more like Justice
Potter Stewart's grasp of pornography: "I know it when I see
it"?
As is often the case with controversial terms, the dictionary is
of limited help here. The American Heritage Dictionary defines
bigotry as "characteristic of a bigot," which it in turn defines as
"one who is strongly partial to one's own group, religion, race, or
politics and is intolerant of those who differ." Webster's
definition of "bigot" is similar: "a person obstinately or
intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and
prejudices."
Now there must be a difference between merely disagreeing with
those who differ and being "intolerant" of them. By definition,
everyone disagrees with "those who differ"-that's just what it
means to "differ." And everyone is "devoted" to at least some of
his opinions. That's the whole point of having convictions.
So it's not bigotry merely to disagree with someone: one must
also exhibit "intolerance." But what does that mean? That one
wishes to silence them? Surely it's possible to be a bigot even
while respecting free-speech rights. Thus, for example, those who
believe that the races should be separated are bigots even if they
believe that those who disagree should be permitted publicly to say
so. It seems, rather, that to call someone a bigot is in part to
express a moral judgment. It is to suggest that the bigot's views
are not merely wrong, but somehow beyond the pale. So the
dictionary definition only gets half of the picture: it's not
merely that the bigot doesn't tolerate those who differ, it is also
that we ought not tolerate him. In a free society we shouldn't
silence him, but we should certainly shun him.
In other words, to call someone a bigot is not just to say
something about the bigot's views, it's to also to say something
about our own. It is to distance our views from his in the
strongest possible terms. It is also to suggest that the bigot
suffers from a kind of systematic irrationality, a logical blind
spot that feeds the moral one.
I have long advocated using the term "bigot" sparingly when
referring to gay-rights opponents. It's not that I don't think
bigotry is a serious problem. On the contrary, it's vital to
identify bigotry for what it is and to expose its tragic
effects.
It's also important to learn the lessons of history, including
the ways in which bigotry can hide behind religion, concern for
children's welfare, and other seemingly benign motives.
But there's a difference between identifying bigotry, on the one
hand, and labeling any and all people who disagree with us as
bigots, on the other. Such labeling tends to function as a
conversation-stopper, cutting us off from the "moveable middle" and
ultimately harming our progress.
It's also unfair to the many decent people who genuinely strive
to understand us even where, for sincere and complex reasons, they
cannot accept our position.
There's a familiar religious saying which teaches "Love the
sinner; hate the sin." Applied to homosexuality, the sentiment is
mostly nonsense. For one thing, there's nothing "sinful" or wrong
about gay relationships per se. Moreover, the distinction draws a
sharp line between who we are and what we do, whereas here these
things are intimately connected.
But the "love the sinner/hate the sin" distinction still has its
uses, and our approach to our opponents may be among them.
Many of our opponents are fundamentally decent people. For both
principled and pragmatic reasons, we don't want to saddle them with
an identity that suggests their being beyond redemption. In other
words, we don't want to label them "bigots" prematurely.
At the same time, we don't want to shrink from identifying the
evil of anti-gay bigotry, wherever and whenever it occurs.
And so, we can distinguish. We can point out the sin of bigotry
forcefully while using the epithet of "bigot" sparingly (though
that epithet, too, has its uses).
Because, in the end, we do know it when we see it.