All right, so the Republicans have had better years. But don't
forget their secret weapon. Not an ABM, MIRV, or MX. An MPA: the
Marriage Protection Amendment, precision-targeted on same-sex
marriage and, through it, the Republican base.
The MPA would amend the U.S. Constitution to forbid gay couples
to marry. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., says he will
bring the amendment up during the week of June 5. It has zero
chance of passing by the required 67-vote majority, as Frist knows.
In 2004, the amendment garnered only 48 Senate votes, and the Human
Rights Campaign, a gay-rights group, figures it will get only about
52 votes this year.
So why bother? Consider Virginia, where in 2004 the
Republican-controlled Legislature hit on the promising formula of
passing both a whopping tax increase and a gratuitously vindictive
anti-gay-marriage law. (The so-called Marriage Affirmation Act
outlawed not only gay marriage and civil unions, but also private
contracts between same-sex individuals seeking to replicate marital
arrangements.) Lyndon Johnson once said, "Hell, give [a man]
somebody to look down on, and he'll empty his pockets for you." The
Virginia formula was in that vein: Knock the gays hard enough, and
maybe conservatives wouldn't notice the tax hike.
In Virginia, the moral-values credit card seemed to have maxed
out in 2005; Democrats held the governorship. Nationally, many
conservative voters seem to have noticed that the same Republican
politicians who are trotting out the marriage amendment have also
spent up a storm, created the biggest new entitlement program since
LBJ's Great Society, riddled the budget with earmarks, and approved
unprecedented restraints on political activity.
Whatever its political merits, the MPA remains as unwise
substantively as when it first came up in 2004. Since then,
moreover, the case for its necessity has disintegrated.
The question posed by the marriage amendment is not just whether
gay marriage is a good idea, but who should decide -- the states or
the federal government? From its debut in 2001, the marriage
amendment was misleadingly advertised as a restriction on activist
courts. In truth, the amendment would strip the power to adopt
same-sex marriage not only from judges but from all 50 states'
legislators, governors, and electorates.
Defining and regulating marriage has been within states' purview
since colonial times. (Utah was required to ban polygamy while it
was still a federal territory. On the few occasions when the U.S.
Supreme Court has intervened, it has curtailed states' powers to
restrict marriage rights, not imposed a definition.)
Why should the federal government usurp the states' authority
over marriage? Amendment supporters have insisted that gay marriage
anywhere would soon spread everywhere. How, they demanded, could
one state have a separate definition of marriage without creating
chaos? Unless the federal government stepped in, they said, one or
two states would impose same-sex marriage on all the rest.
Actually, states have defined marriage differently for most of
the country's history. Until the 1960s, mixed-race marriages were
recognized in some states but not others. That each state is
entitled to regulate marriage in accord with its public policy
views is established legal precedent; otherwise Maryland, say,
could start marrying 10-year-olds and every other state would be
obliged to go along -- an absurdity. Moreover, in 1996 Congress
passed the Defense of Marriage Act, which explicitly relieved the
states of any obligation to recognize other states' same-sex
marriages.
Federal-amendment proponents have claimed that the Supreme Court
might strike down DOMA. That argument, already weak on the law
(DOMA is almost certainly constitutional), is even weaker now that
President Bush's two Supreme Court appointments, Chief Justice John
Roberts and Associate Justice Samuel Alito, have solidified the
Court's conservative majority. Would-be amenders are now reduced to
claiming that the Constitution should be revised to pre-empt a
hypothetical ruling by a future Supreme Court. On this prophylactic
theory of constitutional jurisprudence, it is hard to imagine what
amendment might not be in order.
So far, DOMA has stood up. The country's most liberal federal
appeals court, the California-based 9th Circuit, saw off a
challenge to DOMA just this month. Meanwhile, for more than two
years Massachusetts has been marrying same-sex couples, including
couples who travel and move outside the state. Spot the chaos? The
wholesale legal confusion?
In fact, what is most remarkable about Massachusetts's
gay-marriage experiment is how little legal confusion and
inconvenience it has caused. As evidence that a state-by-state
approach is unworkable, proponents of a federal amendment can point
to a messy Virginia child-custody case and -- well, not much
else.
The social ramifications of gay marriage will take time to
unfurl; but if rampant legal confusion were going to be the result
of Massachusetts' gay marriages, it should have begun to appear by
now.
Indeed, few defenders of a state-by-state approach would have
dared predict that the Massachusetts experiment would create as few
legal tangles as it has. That the states can go their separate ways
on gay marriage is no longer a prediction; it is a fact.
MPA supporters note that a court, and not the people, ordered
gay marriage in Massachusetts. That is true but not relevant.
Congress has no more business overriding state courts than it does
overriding state legislatures. If a state fears that its courts
will order gay marriage, it can change its constitution, which is
exactly what 18 states have already done and what as many as nine
more will do in November. More than half the states have
statutorily banned gay marriage. A handful of states -- California,
New Jersey, New York, and Washington are possibilities -- might
wind up with judicially imposed gay marriage; the large majority,
it is now clear, will not.
In 2004, MPA advocates liked to say that pre-empting state
legislatures and electorates was of no practical consequence,
because only judges would support so alien a notion as same-sex
marriage. That argument expired last September, when the California
Legislature passed the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage
Protection Act, a bill legalizing same-sex marriage. Republican
Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill, but the question is no
longer academic: How do MPA proponents, who claim to champion
democratic decision-making, justify handcuffing the democratically
elected Legislature of the largest state in the union?
At bottom, what many MPA proponents want to forestall is not
judicially enacted gay marriage; it is gay marriage, period. They
say that an institution as fundamental as marriage needs a uniform
definition: a single moral template for the whole country.
That argument would seem more compelling if marriage were more
important than human life. Many of the same conservatives who want
the federal government, not the states, to settle gay marriage also
want the states, not the federal government, to settle abortion.
Sen. George Allen, R-Va., for example, supports the MPA, but he
would like to see Roe v. Wade "reinterpreted" so that states would
decide the fate of abortion. Although the 2004 Republican platform
calls for a "human life amendment to the Constitution," you will
look in vain for any such amendment on the Senate floor.
Two questions for anti-gay-marriage, anti-abortion Republicans:
If states can be allowed to go their own way in defining human
life, why not allow them to go their own way in defining marriage?
Where constitutional amendments are concerned, why is preventing
gay couples from marrying so much more urgent than preventing
unborn children from being killed?
It is precisely because marriage is so important, and because it
is the subject of such profound moral disagreement, that a
one-size-fits-all federal solution is the wrong approach.
California and Texas, Massachusetts and Oklahoma take very
different views of same-sex marriage. By localizing the most
intractable moral issues, federalism prevents national culture
wars.
In 2006, that argument is no longer hypothetical. Federalism is
working. As the public sees that states are coping competently and
that no one state will decide for all the rest, the atmosphere of
panic over gay marriage has mercifully subsided, providing the time
and calm that the issue needs.
The national Republican leadership's bid to upset this emerging
equilibrium is demagoguery, which is sad. Conservative politicians'
betrayal of federalist principles to distract attention from their
broken promises is cynicism, which is sadder. And none of this is
surprising -- which is saddest of all.