Professor Dale Carpenter (who I am happy to be the first to note has just joined our blog with Joan de Fresno) has an excellent piece at another site about religious liberty protections for those opposed to same-sex marriage. He expands on the Jon Rauch/David Blankenhorn compromise, and asks some very pointed questions which, I think, boil down to a single one: How should the law deal with individual religious believers?
The First Amendment protects the "free exercise" of religion, which sounds pretty broad. But as Justice Antonin Scalia has pointed out, if this protection were too broad, it would allow any religious believer to opt out of obeying the law. If any person's action based on a religious belief is the protected exercise of religion, then few laws would be exempt from a potential personal veto. Scalia took this threat seriously in his 1990 majority opinion in Employment Division v. Smith, where the court upheld an Oregon law prohibiting drug use against a challenge from religious believers who wanted to use peyote in a sacramental exercise.
It is usually easy to determine what counts as a religious exercise in a church, and even for a religious entity such as a church-run hospital. But the law protects "sincerely held" religious beliefs, and any individual can sincerely believe pretty much anything, up to an including that
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.
This is an exact quote from the trial judge who originally upheld Virginia's law prohibiting blacks and whites from marrying one another, the law the Supreme Court overturned in Loving v. Virginia.
An awful lot of people believe awfully sincerely that homosexuals are sinners, a belief that is in direct conflict with laws treating lesbians and gay men equally in civil society. I have been concerned about the scope of a personal religious veto, not just with respect to homosexuals but in general, since the early 1990s when I worked on a California Supreme Court follow-up case to Employment Division v. Smith.
Our court didn't adopt a theory I'd proposed on religious freedom, but since 1996, I confess that individual cases of abuse of free exercise have not been clogging the courts as I'd feared. That's why Douglas Laycock's eloquent letter to the Connecticut Legislature resonates with me. He is a well-known scholar of the contours of religious liberty, and notes his own support of same-sex marriage. He argues that religious opponents need some breathing room in our democracy on this issue.
This will come at some cost to same-sex couples who might have to suffer through some uncomfortable face-to-face religious opposition in public situations. That is no small thing for those of us who have encountered it. But those couples will also know that this individual's personal beliefs, whether respectfully and civilly articulated or not, won't prevent the couple from obtaining whatever the law permits and the market provides.
After many years of pondering the options, I think this is a reasonable trade-off. The law, in all its majesty, cannot prevent people from experiencing their deep feelings, and it is at its weakest when it tries. Laycock states what has become painfully obvious:
Refusing exemptions to such religious dissenters will politically empower the most demagogic opponents of same-sex marriage. It will ensure that the issue remains alive, bitter, and deeply divisive.
Laycock is convinced that there won't be a lot of objectors, and while I'm a bit more skeptical, I think it's worth a shot. Religious anxiety really is the only argument left against homosexuality, and even that is fading. If we can kill it off with kindness, I'm for it.