Opponents of marriage equality have recently been shifting
somewhat away from the "bad for children" argument in favor of what
we might call the "definitional" argument: same-sex "marriage" is
not really marriage, and thus legalizing it would amount to a kind
of lie or counterfeit.
As National Organization for Marriage (NOM) president Maggie
Gallagher puts it: "Politicians can pass a bill saying a chicken is
a duck and that doesn't make it true. Truth matters."
The definitional argument isn't new, although its resurgence is
telling. Unlike the "bad for children" argument, it's immune from
empirical testing: it's a conceptual point, not an empirical
one.
Suppose we grant for argument's sake that marriage has been
male-female pretty much forever. (For now, I'm putting aside
anthropological evidence of same-sex unions in history, as well as
the great diversity of marriage forms even within the male-female
paradigm.) All that would follow is that this is how marriage HAS
BEEN. It would not follow that marriage cannot become something
else.
At this point opponents are likely to retort that changing
marriage in this way would be bad because [insert parade of
horrible consequences here]. But if they do, they've in effect
conceded the impotence of the definitional argument. The
definitional argument is supposed to be IN ADDITION TO the
consequentialist arguments, not a proxy for them. Otherwise, we
could just stay focused on the consequentialist arguments.
What Gallagher and her cohorts are contending is that EVEN IF we
were to take the consequentialist arguments off the table, there
will still be the problem that same-sex marriage promotes a lie,
much like calling a chicken a duck.
Let's pause to consider a seemingly silly question: apart from
consequences, what's the problem with calling a chicken a duck-or
more precisely, with using the word "chicken" to refer to both
chickens and ducks?
If I go to the grocer and ask for a chicken and unwittingly come
home with a (fattier and less healthful) duck, that's a problem.
But (1) same-sex marriage poses no similar problem: no one worries
about walking his bride down the aisle, lifting her veil, and
discovering "Damn! You're a dude!" And (2) such problems are still
in the realm of consequences.
If there's an inherent problem with using the word "chicken" to
refer to both chickens and ducks, it's that doing so would obscure
a real difference in nature. Whatever we call them-indeed, whether
we name them at all-chickens and ducks are distinct creatures.
Something similar would occur if we used the word "silver" to
refer to both silver and platinum. Even if no one noticed and no
one cared, the underlying realities would be different.
That might begin to get at what marriage-equality opponents mean
when they claim that same sex marriage involves "a lie about human
nature" (Gallagher's words). But if it does, then their argument is
weak on at least two counts.
First, one can acknowledge a difference between two things while
still adopting a blanket term that covers them both. Both chickens
and ducks are fowl; both silver and platinum are precious
metals.
So even if same-sex and opposite-sex relationships differ in
some fundamental way, there's nothing to prevent us from using the
term "marriage" to cover relationships of both sorts-especially if
we have compelling reasons for doing so (for example, that marriage
equality would make life better for millions of gay people and
wouldn't take anything away from straight people).
The second and deeper problem is that both the chicken/duck
example and the silver/platinum example involve what philosophers
call "natural kinds"-categories that "carve nature at the joints,"
as it were. By contrast, marriage is quintessentially a social, or
artifactual, kind: it's something that humans create.
(One might retort that God created marriage. That rejoinder
won't help marriage-equality opponents attempting to provide a
constitutionally valid reason against secular marriage equality.
But it might help explain why they sometimes treat marriage as if
it were a fixed object in nature.)
Like "baseball," "art," "war," and "government"-to take a random
list-and unlike "chicken" or "silver," the word "marriage" refers
to something that humans arrange and can rearrange. Indeed, they
HAVE rearranged it. Polygamy was once the norm; wives were the
legal property of their husbands; mutual romantic interest was the
exception rather than the rule.
Of course it doesn't follow that any and all rearrangements are
advisable. We could change baseball so that it has four outs per
inning. Doing so might or might not improve the game. But saying
"that's not really baseball!" is hardly a compelling argument
against the change (any more than it was against changing the
designated-hitter rule).
So too with the claim "that's not really marriage." Maybe that's
not what marriage WAS. But should it be now?