Andrew Sullivan and Glenn Greenwald want to know more about Elena Kagan. For my purposes, I think I've got most of what I need. I'll wait for the hearings, of course, and there's no telling what the opposition researchers, tabloid gold diggers and data miners will turn up, but what we already know about Kagan suggests to me she has what it takes to be a fine Supreme Court Justice.
Because the process is at its political zenith, the discussion right now is political. But the glaringly obvious fact very few among the commentariat bring up is that the most important characteristic of a judge - and particularly a Supreme Court justice - is their judgment. And chief among the issues they must exercise judgment upon is the question of what is a political issue and what is a constitutional one.
That distinction has become so muddied in recent decades - by politics - that it is hard to recognize any line at all.
But in my opinion, Kagan has done a fine job of understanding the difference with respect to DADT. At Harvard, she was required to obey the law, which in this case included the Solomon amendment withholding federal funds from any college that tried to frustrate the anti-gay policy of DADT. When an appeals court ruled that the amendment was invalid, Harvard followed the law as it was then interpreted, and when that opinion was appealed, Kagan signed an amicus brief challenging the law's validity - which was well within her rights, along with those of every American on any issue. And when the Supreme Court ruled the amendment was valid, she enforced the law as it was finally adjuged. She stated her personal opinion that it was an unfair and unjust law (which it is), but she implemented it.
It is easy to characterize this as flip-flopping, or in any number of other politically unpalatable ways, and it will be. But it shows that Kagan respects the rule of law while also holding her own moral opinions about laws she views as unjust - and knows the difference. In this, she has shown an understanding of politics that is rare among the political classes who will be judging her.
As a Supreme Court justice, of course, she will have the ability to decide which laws should be subject to the ordinary rules of politics and which to the constitution's more rigorous limitations set out to manage politics. That is an eternal question judges must face, and even the most rigidly conservative among them do enforce the constitution's limits on politics when, in their judgment, that is necessary.
But every constitutional question comes up in a specific case with its own unique facts. That is where judgment comes in, and where nominated judges should not be required to put themselves on the political record in advance. Kagan may or may not know how she would rule on the constitutionality of DADT or DOMA, just as Clarence Thomas may or may not have known how he would rule on the continuing validity of Roe v. Wade. But those questions do not come to the court without complicating facts, and those facts may make all the difference. Nor is "the law" - especially constitutional law -- something that is always self-evident. There is an absolute constitutional right to free speech that Congress may not abridge. Except in some cases. . .
Kagan's sexual orientation - or lack of one - may or may not be important in her thinking. But then, as IGF demonstrates, I hope, even being openly gay doesn't lead inevitably to any particular way of thinking, much less some specific result. The same is true of religion, which the high court illustrates for us every day. If anyone can find any commonality in reasoning among the court's six Catholic justices, I'd love to hear about it. So, in answer to Dale's question below, I'd say her sexual orientation doesn't matter a lot. He may disagree with me -- but wouldn't that make my point?
Judgment is not something that is objectively identifiable. And no biography can predict its presence or isolate it. But I think Kagan has already given us a record of sound and prudent judgment in a hard political case. That's what good judges need, and we need as many people who have it as we can possibly get.