An opponent writes, "What's YOUR definition of marriage? If
you're going to use a word, you need a definition of the word."
I doubt that.
After all, most English speakers can competently use the word
"yellow," but ask them to define the term (without merely pointing
to examples) and watch them stammer.
And then try words like "law," "opinion," and "game" just for
fun. It's quite possible to have functional knowledge of how to use
a term without being able to articulate the boundaries of the
relevant concept.
Alright, you say, but as someone deeply involved in the marriage
debate, surely the Gay Moralist has a definition to offer?
Yes and no. I have definitions to offer, not a definition.
The word "marriage" can refer to many different things: a
personal commitment, a religious sacrament, a social institution, a
legal status.
And even if we focus on one of those-say, the social
institution-there are other challenges. As David Blankenhorn puts
it: "There is no single, universally accepted definition of
marriage-partly because the institution is constantly evolving, and
partly because many of its features vary across groups and
cultures."
Blankenhorn makes this point in his book The Future of
Marriage. It's an interesting concession, since he spends much
of the rest of the chapter railing against marriage-equality
advocates for offering "insubstantial" and "fluttery" definitions
that emphasize personal commitment over marriage's social
meaning.
Not surprisingly, his own definition emphasizes children:
"In all or nearly all human societies, marriage is socially
approved sexual intercourse between a woman and a man, conceived as
both a personal relationship and an institution, primarily such
that any children resulting from the union are-and are understood
by the society to be-emotionally, morally, practically, and legally
affiliated with both of the parents."
Putting aside the odd claim that "marriage isâ¦sexual
intercourse" (rather than, say, a context for such intercourse),
this is actually a pretty good description of what marriage
typically is.
But the "typically" is key. On the very next page, Blankenhorn
acknowledges a counterexample (raised by Christian theologians, no
less): Marriage can't be essentially sexual, since if it were, the
Virgin Mary's "marriage" to Joseph would not be a marriage. (And
one could point to plenty of contemporary sexless marriages that
are nevertheless marriages.)
Moreover, Blankenhorn's own definition includes the hedge-word
"primarily," acknowledging that marriage has goals beyond providing
for children's needs.
My fellow philosophers are often enamored of analyses that
provide "necessary and sufficient conditions" for concepts:
definitions that capture all, and only, the members of a class. But
I have yet to see anyone on either side of this debate do that for
marriage, and I doubt that it's possible.
The definition would have to be broad enough to include unions
as disparate as King Solomon's polygamous household; Elizabeth
Taylor's marriages to her various husbands; my maternal
grandparents' arranged marriage; Bill's marriage to Hillary;
Barack's marriage to Michelle. It would have to make sense of
metaphors such as the claim that nuns are "married" to Christ
(traditional profession ceremonies even involved wedding dresses).
And yet it couldn't be so broad as to include just any committed
relationship.
Are there necessary conditions for a union's being a marriage?
Sure. For instance, there must be at least two persons. (I say "at
least" because polygamous marriages are still marriages, whatever
other objections we might have to them.)
Beyond the "at least two persons" requirement, we find a host of
features that are typical: mutual care and concern, romantic and
sexual involvement, a profession of lifelong commitment, the
begetting and rearing of children.
But "typical" does not mean "strictly necessary," and for any
one of these features, it takes very little imagination to think of
a genuine marriage that lacks it. A "marriage of convenience" is
still a marriage, legally speaking. A childless marriage is still a
marriage. A marriage on the brink of divorce is still, for the time
being, a marriage.
I am not suggesting that any of these scenarios is ideal. But
our opponents' objection isn't that same-sex unions aren't "ideal"
marriages. It's that they're not marriages AT ALL. And that
objection is much harder to sustain when one surveys the various
overlapping arrangements-some with children, some without; some
intensely romantic; some not-that we call "marriage."
So what is marriage? For me, the standard vow captures it
nicely, though of course not perfectly or completely. These are the
words my parents used, and the same words I used with my partner,
Mark:
Marriage is a commitment "to have and to hold; from this day
forward; for better, for worse; for richer, for poorer; in sickness
and in health; to love and to cherish; until death do us part."
"Fluttery?" Maybe. But real, and important, and good.