When Jonathan says the Brookings Institution panel was A Great Debate, he isn't kidding. Jon and David Blankenhorn articulated the philosophical change in style they are aiming for: a discussion that pits two good things against one another (in Blankenhorn's words) rather than one about bigots against perverts (Jon).
If that were all that was said, the debate would have been worth everyone's time.
But another theme emerged, and it will be the crux of the political problem if the compromise gets any takers -- as I hope it will. In order to get the federal government to accept state laws recognizing same-sex couples, states would have to enact robust religious conscience laws making clear that religious organizations would be protected against lawsuits forcing them to recognize same-sex relationships.
But "conscience" is not an organizational attribute, it is a personal one, and the compromise would apparently have to stretch far enough to reach individuals. Everyone agrees the government may not intrude in the sacramental role of religious organizations, but what about religious individuals who function in the civil realm? They claim that their religious beliefs against same-sex marriage would prohibit them from performing their non-religious duties, and want protection for that as well - and the way I read the compromise, it would also include protection for these individuals.
This is where the compromise becomes most pointed. Justices of the Peace work for the state, not the church, yet some have refused to issue licenses to same-sex couples because they have religious objections. In the debate, Professor Robin Wilson discussed the dilemma when a same-sex couple faces a civil servant who refuses to perform the civil ceremony prescribed by the state. There are normally other JPs available, and as with some pharmacists who refuse to perform their job of dispensing contraceptives for religious reasons, as long as the customers are served by someone, all needs can be met - though participants on both sides will have been forced to face, for a bit, the other side's arguments and sensitivities.
But it's important to remember that this accommodation is not a constitutional matter. The constitution does not require states to go this far in accommodating individual religious beliefs. That was established in a 1990 Supreme Court decision, Employment Division v. Smith, which upheld a state law that criminalized drug use, and a prosecution of Native Americans who ingested peyote in a religious practice. If the constitution required a general religious exemption from laws that are generally applicable to everyone, the court reasoned, then each religious believer could become a law unto himself, with a personal veto over any legal obligations he determined were offensive.
The opinion was written by Justice Antonin Scalia, an energetic proponent of religious freedom as a constitutional right, but also a man who's savvy to how people can abuse the courts.
If states have to accommodate even individual religious beliefs against gay marriage, we will need to be wary of the same sort of abuse Scalia was concerned with in Smith. But that is no reason not to try.
