We are indebted to
Peter Sprigg of the Family Research Council and Bryan
Fischer of the American Family Association - not to mention
David Bahati, sponsor of Uganda's Anti-gay
bill - for returning us to a debate that should have been put
out of its misery in 2003: Should homosexual conduct be against the
law?
Lawrence
v. Texas answered the question for constitutional
purposes. The government has no legitimate business making
particular sexual acts a criminal offense if they are voluntary,
adult and in private.
But the constitution isn't everything. For centuries, criminal
prohibitions provided the foundation for official (i.e. legal and
governmental) discrimination against homosexuals. The premises
about homosexuality in those laws are what most older people, in
particular, take for granted. We may no longer be criminals under
the law, but in some people's minds we are certainly doing
something that is wrong.
The unambiguous desire of Sprigg/Fischer/Bahati to reestablish a
legal regime where homosexual conduct is criminal lets us look at
the issue from today's entirely new perspective: Why is some sexual
conduct between consenting adults in private wrong. By "wrong" I
do not mean "a sin," since I am talking about the law here, not
theology. Religious adherents are free to believe, among
themselves, what their religion teaches about sin, whether it's
murder or adultery or dancing. There is much overlap between
criminal laws and theological transgressions, but the two realms
are not identical. Criminal laws in a pluralistic society of
varied religious beliefs have to have justifications beyond
sinfulness, since there is inconsistency between, and even within
religions, and since many people belong to no formalized religion
at all, a choice the constitution requires all of us to
respect.
Sprigg distinguishes between homosexual conduct and homosexual
orientation. Homosexual conduct is bad, but mere orientation is no
problem. Ironically, this is a distinction gay rights supporters
have drawn as well, when it has been advantageous. But it doesn't
answer any questions.
Justice Scalia illustrates the problem in his dissent
in Lawrence: "Many Americans do not want persons who
openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business,
as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's
schools, or as boarders in their home."
Look how casually the thinking here moves from the notion of
homosexual conduct as sex to homosexual conduct as - well, as being
gay. It's safe to assume, I'd think, that few, if any of those
business partners, scoutmasters, teachers or room-renters would be
observing any sexual activity by these particular homosexuals
(though the last category comes very close, which is why it is
given universal exemption in housing discrimination laws). In the
quote, it's not even necessary that any of those people have a
partner at all. The homosexual conduct Justice Scalia is concerned
about people so "openly" engaging in is living their lives without
hiding their sexual orientation. Simply being gay, the way
heterosexuals are straight, is to "openly engage in homosexual
conduct."
The closest to "openly" engaging in conduct that could be
considered sexual is when homosexuals kiss or hold hands while
walking down the street. That's openly being gay, but it's not
different (in the view of the people Scalia is worried about) from
sodomizing your partner right there at the corner of Pico and
Sepulveda.
There is no such concern about heterosexual kissing or
hand-holding. More to the point, no sodomy law ever prohibited
such acts. So why the difference for gays?
That difference is everything. In general, most people don't
spend a lot of time imagining the sex lives of others; or when they
do, it's considered impolite if not outright rude. Yet speculation
like this is taken for granted when homosexuals are the
subject.
It is that permissive speculation about sexual conduct that
brings the bedroom right out into the open, and makes gays ripe for
this kind of condemnation. It reaches its zenith of absurdity in
DADT. DADT strays so far from a requirement of actual conduct that
simply speaking about being gay is sufficient to have a
servicemember ejected. The theory is that this shows a
"propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct, and therefore a mere
statement gives the military sufficient evidence of someone's
unfitness.
Yet heterosexuals have a propensity to engage in heterosexual
conduct - and "propensity" may be understating it for many of them.
Some of their conduct will be the same kind of sodomy as
homosexuals might engage in - specifically oral or anal sex. Yet
for heterosexuals, we don't (as the kids say) go there.
The debate about sexual conduct is not about sexual conduct at
all, but about being openly gay. It is that honesty which is
objectionable. Even Peter Sprigg acknowledges that some people
have a homosexual orientation. The criminal law has as little
effect on that as it could have on preventing the tide from coming
in. All it can do is prevent people from being honest - or, in
Justice Scalia's words, of "openly" engaging in what he calls
"conduct." But as we see in the debate over DADT, when honesty is
a problem the law is trying to solve, there is something deeply
wrong with our priorities.