A common argument against gay marriage is that marriage is for
procreation and gay couples cannot procreate. Let's call it "the
procreationist argument." Is it persuasive?
The procreationist argument starts with the indisputable
proposition that procreation is indispensable to human survival. It
then posits that marriage exists to encourage this indispensable
act to occur within a lasting union. The procreationist may concede
that marriage has other purposes - for example, providing the
married person with a primary caretaker and channeling sexual
activity into monogamous commitments. Still, the procreationist
maintains, these other purposes serve mainly to help sustain the
overarching marital purpose of encouraging procreation and
stabilizing family life for the resulting children.
Individual gay persons can procreate, of course, through means
such as artificial insemination and surrogacy arrangements. But gay
couples, note the procreationists, cannot procreate as a
couple. The distinction is important, they say, because
parents tend to give better care to biological children than to
adopted children. Further, no event helps the durability of a
relationship like the birth of the couple's biological child.
According to the procreationist argument, it is the unique
procreative capacity of male-female couples that justifies the
unique status of marriage itself. It is the one essential attribute
of marriage, supplying its historic male-female definition.
But so what? What are the practical consequences of cutting the
marriage-procreation connection, as procreationists claim gay
marriage would do? I can think of two possible fears. One is that
procreation itself would slow down, perhaps below the "replacement
rate," the level at which humans must reproduce in order to stay
ahead of deaths. This slowdown would imperil the species. The other
fear is that, as the connection between marriage and procreation is
loosened, procreation may increasingly occur outside of marriage.
Both at once could happen, and both would be bad.
What do we make of this argument? If gay marriage would doom
human life on earth and/or mean significantly more illegitimate
children, it should be resisted no matter how much gay couples need
it.
But neither of these consequences seems likely. It's not clear
why straight people would stop procreating if gays could marry. The
factors driving people to reproduce - the needs for love and to
love another, the purported instinct to propagate one's genes,
religious obligations - would still exist if Adam and Steve could
marry.
It's also not clear why gay marriage would drive more straight
couples to reproduce outside marriage. The benefits of marital
procreation would still be available to them, after all. The
problems of non-marital procreation would still be there to
discourage it.
But fortunately we do not have to guess at the probability of
these cataclysmic consequences because we already have much
experience with severing the link between marriage and
procreation.
No couple has ever been required to procreate in order to marry.
No couple has ever even been required to be able to
procreate in order to marry. Sterile couples and old couples
can marry. Couples physically able to procreate but who do not want
to procreate can get married.
Many married opposite-sex couples already fit into one of these
nonprocreative categories. They are a larger segment of the
population by far than gay married couples ever would be. Yet
despite their inherent or explicit rejection of the procreative
marital duty, humans continue to procreate and marriage continues
to be the normative situs for procreation.
The procreationists have two responses to the
nonprocreative-couples argument. First, they say laws are made for
the general rule, not the exceptions. Most opposite-sex couples can
reproduce, but no gay couple can. Second, they argue that the
failure to require married couples to procreate is only a
concession to the impracticality and intrusiveness of imposing an
actual procreation requirement. It is not an abandonment of the
procreation principle itself. It would be unthinkable, on privacy
grounds alone, to subject couples to fertility tests as a
requirement for marriage. We need no such intrusive test to know
same-sex couples can't reproduce, the procreationists observe.
The first response is an evasion. Laws often state general rules
but provide exceptions where appropriate and just. Gay marriage,
like nonprocreative straight marriage, is an appropriate and just
exception to the procreationists' rule that marriage exists for
procreation.
The second response is equally unavailing. If we were serious
about the procreationist project, we could require prospective
married couples to sign an affidavit stating they are able to
procreate and intend to procreate. If in, say, 10 years they had
not procreated we could presume they are either unable or unwilling
to do so and could dissolve the marriage as unworthy of the unique
institution.
That would be neither impractical nor require an invasive
fertility test. That no one has proposed it, or anything like it,
suggests we do not take the narrow procreationist vision of
marriage very seriously. Marriage is not essentially about
procreation because procreation is not essential to any
marriage.
Further, this second response suggests that the general rule of
procreation must bend to the overriding needs and interests of
couples unable or unwilling to live by it. If that exception exists
for nonprocreative straight couples, why not for nonprocreative gay
couples? If there is an answer to this question, it cannot be found
in the procreationist argument.
So the procreationist rule, refined in light of actual lived
experience, is this: Nobody is required to procreate in order to
marry, except gay couples. It's a rule made to reach a
predetermined conclusion, not for good reasons.