For gay-marriage litigants, July was the cruelest month. Prior
to the Washington Supreme Court decision in
Andersen v. King County, there were two substantive state
marriage decisions against them (New York and Connecticut), one
quasi-substantive federal decision against them (the 8th Circuit,
whose broad language went beyond the state constitutional ban at
issue), and three procedural decisions against them upholding the
propriety of ballot initiatives banning gay marriage
(Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Georgia).
But the day the Washington court handed down its decision may
turn out to be the hardest day of all. Andersen is the
most careful, closely reasoned, and comprehensive judicial opinion
to date rejecting constitutional claims to gay marriage. It is much
better, as a matter of conventional legal analysis and
craftsmanship, than the New York Court of Appeals decision in
Hernandez v. Robles rejecting gay-marriage claims in early
July.
Since the principles and arguments on this issue from
state-to-state, and even in the federal courts, are not that
different, the Washington decision will deserve close attention
from other courts. Among the courts next to consider claims for gay
marriage, the New Jersey Supreme Court in particular should grapple
with, and respond to, Andersen if it intends to uphold a
gay-marriage claim.
Andersen shows how legislative advances for gays are a
double-edged sword in litigation over marriage. Some courts
upholding gay-marriage or civil unions claims have cited
legislative progress - eliminating sodomy laws, making adoptions
more widely available, passing employment non-discrimination laws -
as evidence that times and attitudes are changing and as support
for the idea that the legislature has no very good reason to
withhold this last bit of progress from them.
Andersen, by contrast, cites legislative progress as a
reason to deny that anti-gay discrimination should be of special
concern to judges. After all, reasoned the court, gays have made a
lot of legislative progress. Thus, they don't need the protection
of courts the way racial minorities do. Gays can fend for
themselves in the political process, just as most interest groups
do.
This is a dubious theory, since historical scholarship has shown
that groups tend to get heightened judicial protection only
after they've made legislative progress. And once they've
gotten that judicial protection, they don't lose it simply because
the legislature begins to take their concerns seriously.
Since the court saw no reason to strictly scrutinized the
exclusion of gay couples from marriage, it was very easy to uphold
the law. The law need only be "rationally related to a legitimate
state interest." The court rightly describes this form of review as
"extremely deferential" and granting the state "nearly limitless"
power to make policy as it sees fit.
The state claimed that its desire to promote procreation and
child welfare were good enough reasons under this "rational basis"
standard to exclude gay couples from marriage. While they are very
poor policy reasons to exclude gay couples - many heterosexual
couples don't procreate, yet they can marry - the court concluded
that these were minimally "rational" reasons for existing marriage
law.
There is a bright spot for gay couples in the Andersen
decision."We are acutely aware . . . that many day-to-day decisions
that are routine for married couples are more complex, more
agonizing, and more costly for same-sex couples," wrote the court.
It then listed some of the numerous ways in which marriage law
helps families to deal with various crises in life, including the
death or incapacity of a partner, no matter whether the couple has
children.
Lest you think these are just crocodile tears from a gutless
court delivering gay couples to the tender mercies of the heartless
legislature, the court continued: "But plaintiffs have
affirmatively asked that we not consider any claim regarding
statutory benefits and obligations separate from the status of
marriage. We thus have no cause for considering whether denial of
statutory rights and obligations to same-sex couples, apart from
the status of marriage, violates the state or federal
constitution." The court ended with a strong suggestion that "the
legislature may want to reexamine the impact of the marriage laws
on all citizens of this state."
To the state legislature, the message seems to be this: "Get
moving on addressing the hardships faced by gay couples and their
children, some of which we've listed for you. You don't have to
give them marriage and maybe not even all of the rights of
marriage, but something needs to be done. If you don't act, we
might."
To gay-marriage litigants, the message seems to be this: "Go to
the legislature and see what can be done about the sorts of
problems you've identified and that we agree exist. If the
legislature is unresponsive, come back to us not with a claim for
the status of marriage, but with a remedial claim for the benefits
and protections of marriage for your families."
My guess is that this twin message was necessary to get the five
votes needed to uphold the state's marriage laws.
I've previously written that courts confronting gay-marriage
claims may now see three choices: (1) order full marriage
(Massachusetts); (2) deny the claims (New York); and (3) compromise
on civil unions, with instructions to the legislature to decide on
implementation (Vermont).
Choice #3 involves many complications and permutations, but it
seems that the Washington court would like very much to give it a
try. It's a sensible direction for litigants, legislatures, and
courts.