"You don't just want us to tolerate what you gay people do," my
skeptical questioner announced, "you want us to think that it's
RIGHT."
Whenever I hear this point-and it's pretty often-I always think
to myself, "Duh." Of course I want that. Why would anyone think
otherwise?
Actually, the latter question is not entirely rhetorical. Even
my fellow gays ask me why we should care about other people's moral
approval. Beyond the obvious pragmatic advantages-for example, more
moral approval means more favorable voting attitudes, means more
legal rights, means an easier life-why should we give a damn what
other people think? And while we're on the subject, why should THEY
care? Why are our lives any of their business?
There's a myth circulating among well-meaning people that
"morality is a private matter," and that therefore "we shouldn't
judge other people." This is nonsense of the highest order.
Morality is about how we treat one another. It's about fairness and
justice. It's about what we as a society are willing to tolerate,
what we positively encourage, and what we absolutely forbid. It is
the furthest thing from a private matter.
There's a (wholly fictional) story I tell in my introductory
ethics classes about a freshman who wrote a paper defending moral
relativism. His paper was laden with references to what's "true for
you" versus what's "true for me," what's "right for you" versus
what's "right for me" and so on. The professor gave the paper an F.
Surprised and angry, the student went to the professor's office
demanding a justification.
"Well," the professor carefully explained, "I graded your paper
the way I grade all papers. I stood at the top of a staircase and
threw a batch of papers down the stairs. Those that landed on the
first few stairs got A'sâ¦then B's, C's and so on. You wrote a long,
heavy paper. It went to the bottom of the stairs. It got an F."
"That's not right!" the student blurted out.
"You mean, that's not rightâ¦FOR YOU," the professor responded,
grinning.
The moral of the story (aside from, tenured professors do the
darnedest things) is this: despite all of our talk of "right for
you," deep down we believe in public moral standards. We may
disagree about what those are, and about what actions fall under
their purview-but we still believe that right and wrong aren't
entirely relative.
One might object that grading affects other, non-consenting
people, whereas relationships affect only the people involved.
There are two problems with this objection. The main one is that
the latter point is just false. Unless one endorses a "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" secrecy, relationships have a public presence and thus
public consequences. Gays aren't waging the marriage battle just so
we can all go back in the closet. Like most people, we want to
stand up before family and friends, proclaim our love, have it
celebrated for the beautiful thing that it is. (At least, that's
what many of us want.) We want to send the message to young gays
and lesbians that there's nothing wrong with them; that they, too,
deserve to love and be loved, and that there's nothing sinful or
wrong about that. We want to be treated equally in the eyes of the
law. All of these aims affect other people in various ways.
Second, the objection invites the response, "Says who?" Who
decides that only actions affecting other people are appropriate
targets of moral scrutiny? Who determines that that's the right way
to look at morality? And there's no way to answer such questions
without engaging in a bit of moralizing. Value judgments are
inescapable that way. Those who claim that they're not taking any
moral stances about other people's lives are, by that very claim,
taking a moral stance about other people's lives-a "tolerant' one,
though not necessarily a very admirable one. Sometimes, other
people's behavior is horrific, and we should say so.
"Saying so" is part of the confusion here. There's a difference
between MAKING moral judgments and OFFERING them, not to mention a
difference between offering them respectfully and wagging your
finger in people's faces. The latter is not just self-righteous;
it's generally counterproductive. I suspect when people say that
"we shouldn't judge other people," it's really the latter, pompous
kind of moralizing they're concerned to avoid. But we shouldn't
confuse the rejection of bad moralizing with the rejection of
moralizing altogether.
In short, we should care what other people think and do, because
the moral fabric touches us all.