Dale makes a good point that many minorities view the courts in heroic and almost mythic terms. But Newton's law has its legal counterpart: For every myth there is an equal and opposite counter-myth. The anti-gay right, in particular, has done a splendid job of not just de-mythifying the courts, but of delegitimizing them for "activism" on gay equality; it's seldom you will hear them utter the word "court" in the gay rights context without its now joined-at-the-hip modifier, "activist." And, in Newtonian fashion, the left responds in kind when the opportunity presents itself, as it did in the Citizens United case about corporate speech.
Both sides are now positioned for their entirely predictable frenzy on this case. So I'd like to make my usual plea that we not convict judges of politics (usually someone else's) without some kind of due process. In this case, that could be accomplished by actually reading the opinion any judge or group of judges offers.
Dale may be a bit guilty of prejudging in responding to one of the comments to his post, where he says that a very narrow ruling posited by the commenter could look "nakedly unprincipled." That is possible. It's also possible it could look entirely reasonable. Most likely, its bottom line (supporting or opposing marriage equality) will guide people to their conclusion about the judge's principles. While I'd trust Dale to make that decision at the appropriate time, I have a feeling such niceties won't bother the partisans.
Dale's skepticism, though, comes from having read previous opinions on this subject, and I think it's fair for me to disclose that I have some predispositions of my own -- in the opposite direction. To the extent the courts have been political in dealing with homosexuality, it is sometimes against gays.
The fact that we don't know what level of scrutiny sexual orientation should receive from the courts is the tip-off. The courts do - and, frankly, should - make the narrowest decisions that will decide the case before them. Courts shouldn't decide issues (and particularly constitutional issues) unless they have no other choice.
But the question of whether sexual orientation is a suspect class or not has been hanging around the federal courts since the military discrimination cases back in the 1980s. Federal opinions have nibbled around the edges of this, but have taken advantage of the military's unique factors to sidestep the question. The military's vital functions give them constitutional authority to override even fundamental rights like freedom of religion in order to carry out their duties.
For those of us not in the military, though, the question is still unresolved. Some courts have assumed without deciding that sexual orientation gets the lowest level of review. I think that comes from the politcs. Everything we know about equal protection law from the U.S. Supreme Court would and should lead to a finding that laws distinguishing among citizens based on sexual orientation are entitled to the highest level of court scrutiny.
The California Supreme Court is the only one that concluded sexual orientation is entitled to that level of review. It explicitly goes through the neutral principles courts have established for this kind of case, and I think provides a credible and persuasive analysis of each one. Compare their analysis to the dismissal given the issue by New York's highest court.
The retreat to rational basis review can be seen as a response to the heightened politics surrounding sexual orientation. On this issue, the charges of activism will come mostly from the right, and the only defense is for courts to adopt the most deferential posture possible.
But that's not what the precedents say, at least with respect to minorities who have a documented history of irrational discrimination. Laws making a group criminals (some laws still on the books into the present century) would seem to suggest that kind of history.
If this case is decided on equal protection, a responsible opinion would seem to require application of the longstanding principles of equal protection, and a conclusion of whether sexual orientation is entitled to strict scrutiny, middle-tier scrutiny, or rational basis scrutiny - with reasons stated, so those of us so inclined will be able to decide, based on the reasoning, not the result, how neutral (or not) the judge was.