We are indebted to Peter Sprigg of the Family Research Council and Bryan Fischer of the American Family Association - not to mention David Bahati, sponsor of Uganda's Anti-gay bill - for returning us to a debate that should have been put out of its misery in 2003: Should homosexual conduct be against the law?
Lawrence v. Texas answered the question for constitutional purposes. The government has no legitimate business making particular sexual acts a criminal offense if they are voluntary, adult and in private.
But the constitution isn't everything. For centuries, criminal prohibitions provided the foundation for official (i.e. legal and governmental) discrimination against homosexuals. The premises about homosexuality in those laws are what most older people, in particular, take for granted. We may no longer be criminals under the law, but in some people's minds we are certainly doing something that is wrong.
The unambiguous desire of Sprigg/Fischer/Bahati to reestablish a legal regime where homosexual conduct is criminal lets us look at the issue from today's entirely new perspective: Why is some sexual conduct between consenting adults in private wrong. By "wrong" I do not mean "a sin," since I am talking about the law here, not theology. Religious adherents are free to believe, among themselves, what their religion teaches about sin, whether it's murder or adultery or dancing. There is much overlap between criminal laws and theological transgressions, but the two realms are not identical. Criminal laws in a pluralistic society of varied religious beliefs have to have justifications beyond sinfulness, since there is inconsistency between, and even within religions, and since many people belong to no formalized religion at all, a choice the constitution requires all of us to respect.
Sprigg distinguishes between homosexual conduct and homosexual orientation. Homosexual conduct is bad, but mere orientation is no problem. Ironically, this is a distinction gay rights supporters have drawn as well, when it has been advantageous. But it doesn't answer any questions.
Justice Scalia illustrates the problem in his dissent in Lawrence: "Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders in their home."
Look how casually the thinking here moves from the notion of homosexual conduct as sex to homosexual conduct as - well, as being gay. It's safe to assume, I'd think, that few, if any of those business partners, scoutmasters, teachers or room-renters would be observing any sexual activity by these particular homosexuals (though the last category comes very close, which is why it is given universal exemption in housing discrimination laws). In the quote, it's not even necessary that any of those people have a partner at all. The homosexual conduct Justice Scalia is concerned about people so "openly" engaging in is living their lives without hiding their sexual orientation. Simply being gay, the way heterosexuals are straight, is to "openly engage in homosexual conduct."
The closest to "openly" engaging in conduct that could be considered sexual is when homosexuals kiss or hold hands while walking down the street. That's openly being gay, but it's not different (in the view of the people Scalia is worried about) from sodomizing your partner right there at the corner of Pico and Sepulveda.
There is no such concern about heterosexual kissing or hand-holding. More to the point, no sodomy law ever prohibited such acts. So why the difference for gays?
That difference is everything. In general, most people don't spend a lot of time imagining the sex lives of others; or when they do, it's considered impolite if not outright rude. Yet speculation like this is taken for granted when homosexuals are the subject.
It is that permissive speculation about sexual conduct that brings the bedroom right out into the open, and makes gays ripe for this kind of condemnation. It reaches its zenith of absurdity in DADT. DADT strays so far from a requirement of actual conduct that simply speaking about being gay is sufficient to have a servicemember ejected. The theory is that this shows a "propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct, and therefore a mere statement gives the military sufficient evidence of someone's unfitness.
Yet heterosexuals have a propensity to engage in heterosexual conduct - and "propensity" may be understating it for many of them. Some of their conduct will be the same kind of sodomy as homosexuals might engage in - specifically oral or anal sex. Yet for heterosexuals, we don't (as the kids say) go there.
The debate about sexual conduct is not about sexual conduct at all, but about being openly gay. It is that honesty which is objectionable. Even Peter Sprigg acknowledges that some people have a homosexual orientation. The criminal law has as little effect on that as it could have on preventing the tide from coming in. All it can do is prevent people from being honest - or, in Justice Scalia's words, of "openly" engaging in what he calls "conduct." But as we see in the debate over DADT, when honesty is a problem the law is trying to solve, there is something deeply wrong with our priorities.