A Preface to Morals

First published in the Windy City Times on April 23, 1998.

MORALITY, especially the morality of sexual behavior, has become a topic of late in the gay press and in some recently published books.

Although a few of the discussions have addressed variant sexual practices such as S/M or the propriety of where one engages in sex, most discussions I have seen focused primarily on people who have sex with lots of different people.

The concerns seem to be, variously, that such behavior facilitates transmission of HIV, or inhibits a more fulfilling life within a relationship, or constitutes as an impediment to the social acceptance of gays, or is intrinsically wrong in some unspecified way.

This discussion is all to the good: It is important to keep before us the notion that there are, after all, better and worse ways of conducting ourselves, better and worse ways of living our lives.

One of the most irritating things people sometimes say is "Now, don't be judgmental." I always want to snap back, "Of course you should be judgmental, you jerk. That's what you have a brain for."

We are not machines made to run on a preset program. We have to size things up, weigh them, consider, assess and choose as we go along. Judgments are what enable us to live our lives more satisfyingly, to determine what we want, or what is best for us and to pursue it.

At the same time, however, it is not always clear which are the better or worse ways to act. Not only do we disagree about the best ways to live, but we disagree about what principles apply to our behavior and how to resolve conflicts among them. Then too, people's basic psychological constitutions seem to vary considerably, so moral principles might not apply in the same way to all people.

And there is the basic problem of what justifies moral positions. What is their ultimate aim or purpose or justification? In short, what are morals for? Is it personal human happiness or simple self-preservation? Or is it the well-being of society as a whole, or maybe some Platonic intuitions of The Good? Or is it even the arbitrary edicts of some gods or prophets? You see the problem.

As an apt epigraph to his seldom-read essay "On the Basis of Morality" (1841) the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer used a quotation from one of his own earlier works: "To preach morality is easy, to give it a foundation is difficult."

The issue is particularly difficult for gays for at least two different sorts of reasons.

One is, of course, that gays have long been criticized as immoral for acting on sexual and emotional desires that seemed entirely normal and authentic for them. That led many gays to dismiss all talk of sexual morality as just so much hot air: we know that much such talk is nonsense -- homophobia on stilts, so to speak -- so we assume all of it probably is.

Second, much traditional talk about sexual morality was developed and articulated with specific reference to heterosexuals, for whom sexual morality was more obviously self-enforcing and violations carried their own consequences. But it is not clear how relevant heterosexual morality is to our own lives.

It is useful in this connection to recall the pointed limerick that British novelist Norman Douglas included in his ribald collection "Some Limericks:"

There was a young lady named Wilde
Who kept herself quite undefiled
By thinking of Jesus,
Contagious diseases,
And the bother of having a child.

Although Jesus probably had little impact on the exemplary Ms. Wilde (and no doubt that was Douglas's point), promiscuous or careless heterosexual behavior could have the woeful consequence of unwanted children, possibly a burden to the parents, possibly an unwelcome burden to the taxpayers, which no one desired. Not so for gays.

Similarly, much traditional sexual restraint stemmed from women's physical vulnerability and social inequality. Women, unable to support themselves, guarded themselves from larger predatory males, and limited sexual access to the man who would promise lifelong support. But again that does not apply to gays.

"Contagious diseases" does have continuing relevance for us. Although during the 1970s many of us assumed that sexually transmitted diseases were, at worst, mild inconveniences and of little moral significance, AIDS has reminded us of what everyone knew before antibiotics: Sexually transmitted diseases can be crippling, lifelong and fatal for gays as well as heterosexuals, hence their renewed moral significance for both the HIV-infected and in the uninfected.

The example of disease, however, only serves to remind us how much of traditional sexual morality seems rooted in simple prudence, that is, a rational concern for self-preservation, self-protection, self-regard.

It seems, at first glance, oddly ignoble to have something as important as ethics and morals reduced to mere prudence. But to say "reduced" and "mere" is hardly fair. After all, Aristotle places prudence -- the right exercise of judgment in particular contexts -- high on his list of virtues or excellences. Nor, he makes clear, is it an easy virtue to develop. Certain other-worldly religions and philosophies disparage "prudence" along with its exercise and careful development, but they have little to put in its place.

People who have a firm sense of what they want to do with their life, the kind of person they want to be, and who have a sense of what is likely to bring them happiness and a sense of fulfillment will have a better notion of why prudence is a major virtue and what role it plays in their lives.

What seems to be usually lacking, though, in the current discussions is any very clear acknowledgment that a person might have reason to want to develop one sort of character rather than another, or how some sorts of happiness might be more satisfying or fulfilling than others.

It seems likely that only after that claim is made explicit that we can begin to talk in a coherent way about what role -- if any -- a wide variety or large quantity of sexual experience, sexual knowledge, and sexual pleasure can or should play in contributing to or inhibiting someone's overall goal. Without that issue being addressed, how could there be any grounds for judgment at all?

And it should go without saying that knowledge and experience is going to have a different effect or impact on people depending on the way they incorporate it into their overall lives. If the same experience is going to have different effects, then its moral significance will differ from person to person.

Now we can begin to talk about morality.

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